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Abstract
In this paper critical realism is suggested as a
suitable philosophical assumption to guide a
separate, stand-alone retrospective evaluation of
design science projects and artifacts. A main
contribution of the paper is to argue that knowledge
can be gained in retrospective evaluations of design
science projects regardless of the success or nonsuccess of the project itself. Thereby, retrospective
evaluation complements current evaluations that are
mostly means-end focused. The argumentation is
supported through re-visiting two e-government
design science projects, which can be considered
both as failures and successes depending on the
framing. Critical realism puts focus on knowing
through making and widens the use of design science
in areas where utility is not the main goal. Future
research should focus on providing more details on
how a critical realism retrospective in design science
should be carried out.

1. Introduction
The aim of design science research (DSR) is to
extend the boundaries of human and organizational
capabilities by creating new and innovative artifacts;
thus, the goal of design science is utility [1], [2]. This
paper argues that in order to reach the aim of
extending boundaries and capabilities in modern
organizations, the goal of DSR should be more
extensive; thus, DSR evaluation should be based on a
wider range of goals than utility. Furthermore, [3]
makes a call for future research that “illustrates the
benefits of appropriate reflection in the context of
past or ongoing DSR projects in greater detail” [3, p.
165]. Retrospective evaluation in and of DSR is
therefore suggested and discussed in this paper.
Retrospective evaluation can be carried out both
during and after finishing a DSR project, as a standalone effort. Furthermore, design science researchers
should be self-critical in a retrospective where the
researcher critically examines the design process and
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the developed artifact(s). Critical realism (CR) is
proposed as a suitable philosophical assumption to
guide retrospective evaluation in DSR. Thereby, this
research follows [4]–[6], who argue for moving
beyond the limited positivistic notion of the DSR
originator [7] by adopting a CR philosophy [8].
Furthermore, aligning DSR with CR highlights both
rigor and relevance, including the promotion of
emancipatory change, and provides a suitable basis
for attempting to develop a more integrated and
coherent body of theory and research [5].
Emancipatory elements in critical realism can thereby
facilitate ethical and normative awareness in design
science in line with what [9] suggests as suitable for
information systems (IS) research.
The aim with CR retrospective is to improve the
understanding of consequences of choices made and
actions taken, and thereby, enrich the knowing
through making process of DSR. By adopting CR as
a philosophical basis the author envision DSR to
become the methodological choice in research when
the knowing though making is fundamental but the
goal is not primarily on achieving utility. Adopting
CR thereby makes design science more suitable in
some areas of research such as e-government. Design
science is considered valuable for e-government;
however, existing frameworks for design science do
not provide specific guidance on how to apply DSR
in an e-government context [10]. Following this line
of thought, the argumentation made in this paper is
illustrated and supported by re-visiting two egovernment DSR projects where success and failure
differ depending on the framing.
This research thereby complements and extends
existing work on DSR since (i) it explicates that DSR
can have different and/or complementary goals in
parallel with the traditional utility goal advocated by
e.g. [1], [2]. (ii) Retrospective evaluation can extend
and be used in parallel to any of the existing DSR
methodologies such as [1], [2], [11]–[13]. (iii) It
encourages putting more focus on evaluation of DSR
research projects as a stand-alone research endeavor
and argues that valuable knowledge can be gained
regardless of the success or non-success of a DSR
project. By advocating critical realism as an explicit
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underlying philosophical assumption, this research
also addresses the need expressed by [14] to explicate
underlying beliefs and assumptions when doing DSR.
By focusing on providing a philosophical basis
for stand-alone evaluation of DSR projects and
artifacts, this paper differs from other researchers
who relate CR to DSR by suggesting a separate
methodology based on CR [15], and from researchers
focusing on DSR only as a philosophy beneficial to
combine with CR philosophy without mentioning any
DSR method or suggesting how this should be done
[4]–[6]. All these authors also leave emancipatory
and critical elements of CR out of their scope,
although they mention their importance.
This article is structured accordingly: after the
introduction, related work on design science is
presented and CR is further explained. Then design
science evaluation is discussed followed by the revisitation of the two illustrative e-government cases.
The article ends with a discussion and conclusions
and suggestions for future research.

2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Design Science Knowledge
Design science is the science of the artificial and
has its roots in engineering and science of the
artificial [7]. Two of the most important works that
has defined design science research are [1] and [2].
The aim of design science as described by these
authors is to change reality and make it better through
the design of Information Technology (IT) artifacts
such as constructs, models, methods, and
instantiations [1]. Another important outcome from
design science is knowledge, such as design theories
[16] and abstractions that can be used in designing
and implementing IS initiatives [15].
More recently, a research stream that has a
broader focus and addresses IS artifacts as sociotechnical systems instead of only considering IT
artifacts has emerged [15]. Socio-technical DSR
differs from traditional DSR since it is more firmly
embedded in the context where it is developed [15].
Although it can be argued that socio-technical DSR
differs from traditional IS, they share the focus of
knowing though making and the focus on change.
The research processes suggested for both are also
similar, although the focus on artifact output (e.g. [1],
[2]) or theory output (e.g. [11], [12]) differs. DSR is
thereby regarded as relying on an iterative process
that contains three main parts: defining or finding a
problem to solve, designing an IT/IS artifact that
solve the problem, and evaluation to prove that the

artifact did in fact improve status quo (e.g. [7], [1],
[2], [11], [13], [17]). The evaluation should be judged
by the utility of the artifact [1], [2].
The need to produce knowledge (i.e. design
theories) during the design and evaluation activities is
also an important part of design science (e.g. [11],
[12], [15]) The knowledge production of DSR has
been articulated as knowledge of how to achieve
desired ends or prescriptive knowledge [1], [16],
[18], [19]. In [19] Gregor compares design theories
with recipes and states that following a provisioned
recipe will cause an artifact of a certain type to come
into existence.
In [20] the prescriptive knowledge sought in
design science is considered problematic from the
perspective of management studies. The authors
argue that design science is beneficial and relevant
for management research “if it stands for
investigating the complex nature of a design process
in which ‘designers’ creatively use resources and
engage with evolutionary patterns in order to reshape
environmental constraints and create novel artifacts”
[20, p. 183]. When design science is applied as
prescriptive research, different from explanatory
social research, the application of design science for
management is considered very limited and not as
fruitful for generating understanding [20].
In human-computer interaction, [21] also see
weaknesses in prescriptive knowledge especially in
the form of methods, and propose meals and
ingredients rather than recipes as an analogy to argue
for their standpoint. Applying this analogy on DSR
would imply that apart from prescriptive design
knowledge (the recipe), what has made up the
recipe—the ingredients (e.g. the people working in
the project, the context, people touched by the
artifact, external factors affecting it, etc.) and how it
was cooked (the process leading to the developed
artifact and choices made)—needs to be understood
to make the recipe understandable and thereby
usable. The views expressed by [20], [21] thereby—
to some extent—oppose the work by [19] on theory
in IS.
2.2 Critical Realism
Philosophical assumptions are the basics for
scientific paradigms, which are important because
they legitimize how knowledge may be created and
what constitutes valid knowledge [22]. Critical
realism as a philosophical assumption was introduced
by [8] and can be seen as an alternative to the most
prominent research paradigms in information
systems, i.e. of positivism and interpretivism [23].
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According to [24], three aspects can distinguish a
research paradigm: ontology, epistemology and
methodology. It can be argued that a fourth aspect,
i.e. axiology, should also be considered in research
paradigms that concern inquiry [25]. Axiology
concerns the nature of value and the value question of
what is intrinsically worthwhile [25]. Regarding these
four aspects, ontology is the most important concept
in critical realism and also the importance of
separating ontology from epistemology. Critical
realism ontology argues that a real world exists, apart
from our human experience and knowledge, i.e.
realism ontology. Opposed to positivism, critical
realism, however, states that human understanding
and knowledge of the real world are socially
constructed and fallible, thereby adopting a more
interpretive epistemology [26]. Critical realism also
contains an emancipatory axiology often associated
with a critical research paradigm, e.g. [27].
According to [23], critical realism “offers exciting
prospects in shifting attention to the real problems
that we face and their underlying causes, and away
from a focus on data and methods of analysis” [23, p.
795]. In regards to methodology, critical realism
favors using a variety of methods to identify
underlying mechanisms of observed events [26].
The basic theoretical building blocks for critical
realism are objects (entities) and the external and
visible behavior of people, systems, and things as
they occur, or as they have happened. Another key
aspect in critical realism is retroduction [28], and the
question asked is, “What must be true in order to
make this event possible?” A closely related concept
is abduction, which advocates the observation of
phenomena through theory to derive explanatory
theory about the phenomena [26]. Critical realism is
thereby “a powerful tool in understanding the
interplay of structure and agency in design activity
dependence,
and
in
theorizing
generative
mechanisms, well suited to theorize aspirations to a
more humane and equal society” [5, p. 606].
Another important part of critical realism is the
notion of different domains in the world that is the
real, the actual and the empirical [8], and the
accompanying levels, i.e. mechanisms, event and
experiences [29]. Mechanisms cause events in the
actual domains, which in turn become experiences in
the empirical domain [30]. Outcomes thereby arise
from the multifaceted relationship between powers,
structures, and predispositions that create generative
mechanisms [31]. As humans we can experience
outcomes in the empirical domain, whereas the event
is actually happening in the real domain and is caused
by mechanisms operating in the actual domain [26].
Since human experience is limited to outcomes

located in the empirical domain, they are always open
to different interpretations. Thereby, observations are
always fallible, the understanding of social situations
remains incomplete, and there can be no definite
criteria to judge the truth of explanations [26]. In
order to find the best or most suitable approximation
of truth, critical realism trusts the researcher to
accumulate data that facilitate differentiation among
alternative explanations, and the research community
to debate them thoroughly [26]. Critical realism
differs in this aspect from established paradigms, for
example positivism, where domains and layers are
flattened, implying that a single empirical experience
gives direct access to outcomes, including those that
certainly arise in the real and actual domains, and in
the events and mechanisms layers [28].
CR thereby offers a perspective upon which to
base reflective and critical analysis. The
methodological support in CR is, however,
considered limited and needs more investigation.
Examples of research that suggests methodological
guidelines for doing CR research in IS are [32] for
data analysis and [33] for case study research. Also,
[34] discusses implications of CR in mixed methods
research. These authors do not, however, address CR
in DS.

3. Considering Evaluation in DSR
Several authors have proposed methods for
evaluating DSR artifacts (e.g. [35]; see also [36] for a
comprehensive review of existing artifact evaluation
methods). The scientific evaluation of DSR should
include both the utility of the designed artifact, and
the quality of the design science knowledge outcomes
[35]. The evaluation of knowledge outcomes should,
according to [35], provide evidence that the theory is
correct, i.e. leads to development of artifacts that
solve problems or make an improvement. In regards
to evaluation of the artifact as an output, [9, p. 85]
writes, “A design artifact is complete and effective
when it satisfies the requirements and constraints of
the problem it was meant to solve,” this is articulated
as the utility of the artifact. Thereby the most
common evaluation type is a means-end-oriented
evaluation [37], mostly interested in how effectively
the artifact helps achieve the given goals or ends
[37]. This is also the type suggested by [1], [2] and
also [11], [13], [17] who state that the outcome of the
DSR evaluation is a measure of how well the artifact
solves the defined problem. The means-end-oriented
types of DSR also have a epistemological standpoint
of positivism [3] in common, although both
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies
are allowed to evaluate the utility of the artifact.
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The claim that most DSR research is positivistic
is further supported by, for example [22], who see an
implicit positivistic paradigm in both [38] and [1].
Consistent with a positivistic view, the preferred
methods for evaluation in design science is,
according to [1], quantitative methods such as
computational and mathematical methods, although
empirical methods are also allowed.
Evaluation in general has also had a strong
emphasis on positivistic measures of success [39].
Current evaluation outcomes are thereby considered
restricted and their value less, due to the narrow
ontological and epistemological foundations and
because they only assess outcomes of interventions in
the experience layer and empirical domain [39], [40].
Positivistic evaluations can thereby only provide a
measure for comparing achievement against predetermined objectives (i.e. means-end) but fail to
define the causal influences (mechanisms) that can
generate the observed outcomes. Insights into
plausible explanations of mechanisms and
relationships behind an observed event occurring
within an intervention such the implementation of a
DSR artifact in a public organization remain implicit
and unknown. Following the argumentation made by
[39], [40] utility as a measure for success in DSR
evaluation is considered limited. One example is that
utility, as often used in DSR evaluation, only
considers the capacity or usefulness [1] of the object
and actively disregards the ability of the users and the
organizational context as a “why” question to be
solved by behavioral science [1]. Although the
necessity of considering more aspects than the
capacity of the artifact in isolation has been
acknowledged [11], they remain uncommon in DSR.
Utility in relation to DSR artifacts also constantly
changes. Ten years ago, it was important to keep
communication interfaces compressed and small, and
even XML was considered too chatty due to the
limited bandwidth; today, we easily stream motion
pictures. When an evaluation is carried out also
impacts the utility, for example, ex-ante (measuring
the potential of an artifact) or ex-post (measuring the
actual benefits). More recently, the need to address
the limitations in the concept of utility has also been
acknowledged (e.g. [3], [35], [41]). For instance, [41]
suggests a fitness-utility model for evaluation in
DSR; to accommodate utility in the future, the
guiding philosophical assumption is, however, still
positivistic and does not address the issues of
extracting knowledge from failures or include values
that fundamentally differ from utility.
Basing the generation of knowledge only on
success is, however, not the only way, and sometimes
not even the most preferable one [42], [43]. In line

with this traditional, evaluation methods have also
been criticized by [42] since they only consider
intended or expected outcomes and fail to detect
outcomes or consequences that were not included in
the logical framework or research hypothesis. In [42]
risks are also identified when ignoring negative
consequences that can affect the weak and vulnerable
groups. Research programs thereby risk failing on
equity objectives, allowing richer and more powerful
groups to enjoy a disproportionate share of program
benefits, while resulting in serious negative
consequences for some groups—usually the poorest
and most vulnerable [42]. Current IS design science
discourse for socio-technical design projects do not,
however, encourage, or even guide, researchers to
prevent their artifacts from triggering negative
consequences for society [3].
Relating the argumentation made by [42], [43] to
DSR would imply that the focus on defining a DSR
problem that has a possible solution limits the scope
of possible problems and also puts unsolvable
problems out of scope for DSR. There is also a risk
with the means-end-oriented evaluation that problems
are simplified to make it possible to solve them, since
the value of the research is defined as the solving of
the specified problem. One example would be to limit
the number of stakeholder perspectives since they
often differ and thereby complicate the problem
definition. This in turn could lead to excluding
stakeholder groups with less influence, while letting
strong stakeholder groups define the problem. There
is also a risk of omitting the publication of design
science failures or at least trying to hide such failures
by only evaluating specific features that are expected
to be successful. Support for the argumentation is
found in [3], who state that current evaluation
methods in DSR, including [1], [2], [16], [35], can
lead to limited perspectives and misleading ex-ante
and ex-post evaluations of potential and real impacts
of designed artifacts. Furthermore, [13] argues that
innovation potential can be lost when the focus is
only on problem-solving of pre-specified problems in
DSR. It seems obvious that the process of knowing
through making can be hindered by the need to prove
the utility of the result, i.e. the developed artifacts.
What if an artifact cannot be proven to deliver
enough utility? Should the research process, and the
knowing that was produced during the making of the
artifact also be judged as not good?
The goal of utility in DSR can also be related to
how DSR research is evaluated by the research
community, by using the notion of falsification as
defined by Popper [44] as the demarcation line
between science and pseudoscience. How do you
judge whether an artifact provides better utility, or
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functions better than any other artifact? According to
[35] one possibility is to compare to other artifacts
with a similar purpose. To do this in a real setting is,
however, challenging. For instance, how should you
define which artifacts to compare? How do you gain
access to them? How do you eliminate variables such
as marketing or country specific circumstances? Even
if you manage to make a comparison, how do you
define what and how to compare? It is also a risk that
aspects for comparison are chosen based on the
intention to prove the utility of the designed artifact.
It is thereby difficult to provide a convincing
argument or “proof,” while at the same time the
possibility of falsification [44] is hampered since it is
equally difficult to prove that the artifact does not
provide utility, using the same arguments. The
opportunity to disregard the outcome of design
science research due to the lack of utility is thereby
always present because objectively proving the utility
of an artifact without doubt is not possible. Instead of
providing universal truth, [45] states that the goal of
evaluation is to identify what works for whom in
what circumstances. To guide this work, an
evaluation framework based on CR is presented
where context and mechanisms lead to outcomes.
This can be related to the food analogy where the
meals and ingredients are part of what is behind (the
mechanisms) of any recipe. Transferring the
argumentation of [39], [40] and [45] to DSR, it can
be argued that CR-guided DSR evaluation
retrospectives provide the tool to generate
understanding from DSR projects as advocated by
[20], [21], and also addresses the need for meals and
ingredients, rather than recipes as expressed by [21].

4. Retrospective
To illustrate the value of a DSR retrospective, a
re-visit to two DSR projects in an e-government
context is made. Due to space limitation, a complete
CR retroduction where underlying mechanisms are
identified and elaborated to explain the findings was
not, however, possible; but still, the re-visitation is
considered to provide a foundation and motivation to
the argumentation made in the paper since it
visualizes the need to extend what is regarded as
valuable in DSR.
4.1. The Open Social E-service Project
The first case is a three-year e-government project
funded by the Swedish Governmental Agency for
Innovation Systems, named Vinnova. Other
publications within the project include [46]–[51]. The

project, named “Open Social e-Services,” took place
between 2009 and 2012 with an extension of 6
months in 2012. The project involved representatives
from the public sector, i.e. from one municipality,
and IT vendors, as well as academics from the
disciplines of information systems, social work, and
law. The purpose of the project was to develop open
social e-services to improve citizen services and
decrease authoritative barriers to assisted living
services. The result was a number of new e-services,
i.e. artifacts for assisted living, such as emergency
help
telephones,
part-time
successors
and
companions. Citizens apply for services online, and if
they meet predefined eligibility criteria, they receive
immediate approval and can start using the service.
Integration towards existing administrative systems
as well as service providers ensured a digital and
automated application process.
Several types of evaluations were conducted
during the project lifetime; examples are process
verification tests, usability tests, and benefit analysis.
The results of the evaluations show that most of the
goals set for the project are being met [48]. Examples
of measures that were evaluated and met are that the
administrative work time can be reduced by 85% and
the lead-time from application submission to decision
received was reduced from seven working days to
four minutes [49]. Business models for ensuring the
afterlife of the artifacts were also developed.
4.2. Revisiting the Open Social E-service Project
A re-visitation of the project in 2014 showed that
no other municipality had started to use the service,
and the Swedish municipality where the project took
place did not yet have well-functioning routines for
handling the open social e-services; instead, a
number of problems of getting the solution into use
were still present to a large extent. At present (2016),
the services have been taken down from the web page
of the municipality and is thereby no longer in use.
The main reason is said to be because no cases were
submitted through the e-services. One explanation to
why the service was not used is that the target group
of elderly citizens did not have the ability to use the
e-service since it required the user to, for instance,
have an e-legitimation.
The result of the project has, however, been
successfully used for educational purposes by several
researchers participating in the project. Examples
include; teaching business process modeling, egovernment service design and examples of how IS
artifacts can reduce time consuming tasks by
automation. As a teaching resource the results from
the project have thereby been highly valued.
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Knowledge gained from the project include for
instance the following: (i) the knowledge on how to
legally automate positive decisions based on
predefined criteria, (ii) an understanding of the timeconsuming tasks by employees at the municipality,
(iii) understanding that IS can remove repetitive and
simple tasks and instead facilitate professionalism for
case handlers within the social service department.
(iv) The understanding that several of the developed
services were similar and could be carried out in a
similar fashion. Other benefits include negotiation
power towards IT-vendors and improved competence
of procurement of IT services. From the non-existent
usage, the knowledge of considering all stakeholder
groups was also gained as well as the importance of
the users. Most of the envisioned benefits were not
realized, although initial evaluations indicated that
effectiveness and efficiency could be greatly
improved by using the designed artifacts. The revisitation does, however, also show that several other
benefits (see examples above), not envisioned, have
been attained. The values of these benefits are
difficult to measure and were not part of the initial
goals of the project, but they are still valuable.
Regarding the project as a complete failure, therefore,
provides an erroneous picture.
The re-visitation also puts focus on the problem
space and problem definition in conjunction with
evaluation. If we regard the problem space as the
problem of improving the present case handling
routine, and the artifact only as an isolated IT artifact,
then we can evaluate the capacity of the IT artifact to
solve the problem without considering the context
and excluding the stakeholders and we arrive at a
high utility. If we instead consider the problem as
that of improving the case handling process from
start to end and the artifact as an IS artifact, we also
have to evaluate all aspects including context and
stakeholders. The result of such an evaluation instead
yields almost zero utility.
4.3. The Munizapp Project
The second case is a research project set up in
2010 and also funded by Vinnova. The goal of the
project was to develop an m-government solution that
enables citizen sourcing, and thereby facilitates
collaboration between local governments and
citizens. Other publications within the project include
[52]–[56]. Two software development companies
developed the artifact; one built a front-end app, and
the other developed an e-platform and also
integration towards case handling systems in
municipalities. Eight municipalities in Sweden of
different size and demography represented the user

side of the municipal systems in the project.
Reference groups representing citizens as users were
also part of the project. Within the project, a business
model for the continuation of the solution into a
commercial phase was developed. The project ended
in June 2013, and the solution is now commercialized
through one of the SME partners that participated in
the project.
The solution was evaluated through experimental
and testing evaluations. Controlled experiments,
functional tests, and simulations were performed
through iterative prototype testing by the project
participants. Improvements were identified during the
evaluations and fixed by the developing companies.
In the evaluation of the final prototype version,
thirty-five citizens tested the solution and then
responded to a survey. Citizens demonstrated a
positive attitude toward the solution. A number of
citizens stated that they found the app intuitive and
easy to use. Citizens also gave suggestions for
improvements to the app. A theoretical evaluation of
the solution [52] was performed using a citizensourcing framework. The findings from the
theoretical evaluation of the solution show that the
solution includes functionalities supporting open
government and citizen sourcing [52].
4.4. Revisiting the Munizapp Project
A re-visitation in 2015 made through interviews
with IT vendors, municipalities, and a web page
survey showed that the app is offered by nine
Swedish municipalities out of the total of 290
municipalities in Sweden. Five of these
municipalities are using a case handling system with
integration towards the Munizapp artifact. These five
have received several hundreds of reports made by
their citizens. None of these five municipalities,
however, participated in the design of the solution.
The owner of Munizapp considers the adoption rate
very low, but admits that no marketing efforts have
been made to sell the solution to Swedish
municipalities, except by the only IT-vendor selling a
case handling system integrated with the solution.
The Munizapp app was found to be the best with
regard to ease of use as well as functionality. It was
also the only app providing two-way communication
between municipalities and citizens.
The re-visitation of the project shows that
artifacts can be considered as partly fulfilling the
initial goals of the project. The artifact has been
shown to enable citizen sourcing and collaboration,
which is taking place but to a very limited extent.
Several knowledge claims can, however, be made
from the project. Examples include the need to
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consider IT-vendors as an important stakeholder in
citizen-sourcing, the difficulties in balancing
government and citizens needs, and also the
impossibility of designing for citizens as a
homogenous group. Knowledge was also gained in
risks associated with the solution, such as the
exclusion of groups who do not own smartphones,
privacy risks and information quality risks.
4.5 Summary
The re-visitation to the two e-government projects
provides a scattered picture of the utility of the
artifacts designed. The initial evaluations during
testing and design show great potential for
improvements both in regards to effectiveness and
efficiency and also in regards to political goals of
openness. Ex-post evaluations provide a different
picture; most of the benefits envisioned at the
beginning have not been realized at all by the
developed artifacts, especially with regard to
effectiveness and efficiency. It could, therefore, be
argued that the artifacts have not addressed the
identified problems.
With regard to design science evaluations, this
picture would suggest that the utility of the artifacts
could not be proved, at least not continuously. It
could, therefore, be argued that the artifacts do not
yield utility, which in turn could be regarded as a
failed design science effort [1]. According to CR,
non-occurrences of expected events also should,
however, be of interest and can be learned from [26].
As shown above, values other than effectiveness and
efficiency, or even other than problem solving, have
been realized. It can also be argued that problem
solving, or rather problem-understanding, has been
improved by the design efforts—in other words,
knowing through making has taken place. It can also
be seen that change has happened, although not the
changed envisioned.

5. Discussion
According to [39] and [40], CR should
complement existing evaluation approaches in
evaluations that are “multi-faceted, mixed mode
empirical methodology embracing pluralistic
perspectives and multiple stakeholders” [40, p. 3].
This can be related to the socio-technical view of
DSR, which according to [15], differs from
traditional DSR. The reasons are that effects can be
more difficult to isolate and evaluate, and knowledge
is more deeply embedded in the context [15]. This

also makes developing and evaluating the design
knowledge a complex task [15].
Compared to previous research in DSR where the
focus remains on problem-solving (although to a
varied extent), this research argues for a wider focus
in DSR that also includes other values such as
problem-understanding and ethics. I also argue, in
line with [57], that prescriptions are not the only—
and perhaps not a sufficient theoretical outcome of
socio-technical design science research. Furthermore,
it can be argued that the problem can never be known
beforehand, but is instead iteratively understood as
the development of an artifact unfolds, similar to the
reasoning by [11], [12]. By designing the problem
beforehand and then performing evaluations that
match the initial problem understanding, knowledge
is reduced to recipes rather than meals and
ingredients. To avoid focusing only on problemsolving [13] suggests an agile design science
methodology but does not include retrospectives that
can be considered a very important part of any agile
methodology to continuously, and after each project,
get feedback, and learn from the experiences of
different participants.
To address the above-mentioned weaknesses in
DSR while still acknowledging the value of current
DSR methods is to perform CR-guided retrospective
evaluation of both artifacts and DSR projects. This
research thereby extends and complements the agile
DSR method suggested by [13]. The CR-guided
retrospective is especially considered beneficial for
socio-technical DSR endeavors due to the arguments
put forth by, e.g. [15]. The CR-guided retrospectives
can be carried out in parallel and/or after the project
is complete in order to both expand knowledge
creation opportunities and to identify mistakes made
to improve the research process—i.e. to do better
next time. Transferring the argumentation of [39],
[40] and [45] to DSR, it can be argued that CRguided DSR evaluation retrospectives provide the
tool to generate understanding from DSR projects as
advocated by [20], [21], and also addresses the need
for meals and ingredients rather than recipes as
expressed by [21]. Furthermore, the use of CR theory
other than prescriptive theory can be generated,
which would make DSR more applicable to
management research as stated by [20].
CR regards non-occurrences as interesting as
expected outcomes of events [26]. Outcomes of DSR
projects that turn out to be unusable or that are used
in a fashion that differs completely from what was
intended at the start, are thereby considered as
important for knowledge generation as successful
outcomes. Other researchers in DSR (e.g. [11], [12])
have also brought up the need to investigate
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unintentional effects of DSR artifacts, but the
wording implies that they are less important than the
main (intended) effects. Following CR, this article
argues that the understanding of the problem is as
important as solving it in regards to learning and
knowledge production. Therefore, knowledge can be
produced regardless of the utility of the artifact.
The idea of adopting a CR philosophy when
doing design science research is not completely new.
In regards to the ideas put forward by [4]–[6]—that
CR and DSR have similarities and can benefit each
other—I agree. This paper does, however, differ in
scope and area since [4]–[6] focus on DSR and CR
on a philosophical level and do not mention DSR
methods. Furthermore, the authors [4]–[6] do not
consider evaluation in DSR, and the focus is mainly
on organizational identity and management, although
the critical and emancipatory element in CR is
pointed out. In [15] as well as in [4]–[6] it is noted
that CR contains critical and emancipatory elements
and that they are important, but the focus remains
solidly on the management and profit (utility)
perspective, while the critical issues are left for future
exploration and development. This paper argues that
a retrospective guided by CR provides the
opportunity to focus a DSR project on goals separate
from utility. Examples are; goals discussing ethical
issues, facilitating participation, transparency and
collaboration (i.e. open government issues) or
understand and explain organizational phenomena.
Thereby the benefits of the critical and emancipatory
element of CR for DSR are highlighted.
The theory-generating DSR method suggested by
[12] is close to introducing a retrospective in the form
of an extended theory generation phase. The problem
of mixing utility with knowledge generation, as
pointed out in this research, is not as prominent in the
theory-driven type of DSR, for instance [11], [12].
An explicit recognition that knowledge production
might be possible, although the designed ensemble
artifact did not address the class of problem identified
is, however, still missing in [11]. The evaluation part
of [12] is also still means-end-oriented. It is clear that
the main objective of evaluation remains, “proving or
disproving the design theory and/or the utility of the
DSR artifacts” [35, p. 81]. Thereby, the CR-guided
retrospective evaluation could potentially be applied
to complement the action design method proposed by
[11]
and the theory-generating DSR method
suggested by [12]. The knowledge creation process
could thereby be enhanced to include an explanation
of underlying mechanisms and the inclusion of, for
instance, ethical perspectives. It would also allow
failures in the artifact outcomes without diminishing
the knowledge outcomes.

6. Conclusions
This article re-evaluates the outcomes of two
different design science research projects and argues
that there are several weaknesses in the present
evaluation methods of design science research,
especially regarding the outcome of design science
research as socio-technical artifacts. As a solution,
critical realism is proposed as a philosophical ground
to improve design science evaluation in the form of a
stand-alone retrospective.
The main contribution of this work is to
complement existing DSR methods with a
philosophically grounded retrospective that can be
used to improve both the knowledge creation and the
research process. The choice of CR as guiding
philosophy for the retrospective is considered
beneficial since it enhances the reach of DSR by
providing a value-aware evaluation that is not limited
to means-end-oriented research, but focuses on the
knowing through making aspect of DSR. Thereby,
CR
guided
DSR
retrospectives
recognize
organizations’ obligations towards local and global
societies, people outside the organizations
(customers, citizens, etc.) as co-creators of value, and
the duality of information systems to both co-create
and co-destruct value simultaneously [58].
A possible weakness of critical realism is that as
argued by [8], CR only operates by retroduction,
which implies that events must have happened in
order to be understood and explained. Thereby
retrospective evaluations could require longitudinal
studies that might be difficult to carry out. I would,
however, argue that this should not be regarded as a
weakness, but instead as support for an iterative and
agile design science methodology. Therefore, shortterm projects can also deliver designs that can be
evaluated in a real setting and then improved in steps
in conjunction with a better understanding of the
problem space. Retrospectives can then be performed
after each iterative cycle and not only after the
completion of a step-wise DSR process. Thus, the
suggested approach is more appropriate to DSR
methods such as [11]–[13] compared to [1], [2].

7. Future Research
Future research should develop the ideas suggested in
this paper in order to provide more detailed
guidelines for how to conduct CR-guided
retrospectives in DS. One possibility in this work
would be to depart from the work by [33] on case
study research guided by CR, and develop the
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guidelines provided
there to fit retrospective
evaluation in DSR. Also, a deeper CR-guided
retrospective on the cases presented here should be of
interest in order to increase the understanding of how
to do DSR in e-government as well as to develop
design theories for e-government.
The use of agile methodologies in conjunction
with critical realism also provides a prosperous way
forward for creating improved design science
guidelines—something that could also be undertaken
in future research. Lastly, it would be interesting to
further investigate inherent contradictions in IS
artifacts in conjunction with value creation and
collaboration, and adding critical realism as a
perspective on existing research in this area.
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